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International Law and the Conditions
for Order in International Finance:
Lessons of the Debt Crisis
Writing in 1982, Sir Joseph Gold advised us that:
In the interest of order in international finance, it remains desirable that lenders,
whether official or private, should encourage requests for stand-by arrangements as
conditions precedent to entry into their own loan agreements when made to support the
balance of payments or reserve position of a member. For the same reason, it is
desirable also that lenders should tie provisions of their agreements into the terms of
stand-by arrangements. . . .The contribution of the Fund to order is its maintenance of
the standards of conditionality.'
The advice, as usual for Sir Joseph, was not only sound but farsighted. In fact,
since the international debt problem of developing countries has taken such
widespread proportions as to acquire the popular name of crisis, acting on the
advice on a necessarily case-by-case basis has become a central instrument, and
indeed standard operating procedure, for the international financial community
as a matter of crisis management. This was due to a combination of factors: the
fundamental importance of sound, national economic policies by the debtor
countries, without which no solution could be considered viable and sustainable;
the recognition that broad international cooperation helps the parties caught up in
the debt crisis to protect their interests or achieve their goals; 2 the availability in
the Fund of the highly developed technique of the stand-by arrangement as the
framework for cooperative international financial support for national policies;
and last, but not least, the underdeveloped state of both national legal systems
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and the international legal system in either preventing or dealing with disorder in
international finance. 3 This combination of circumstances illustrates two related
points that help explain the value of Sir Joseph's contributions to international
monetary law. The first point is the insight that in our interdependent world
international cooperation through international organizations has an indispens-
able role in dealing with problems of international economic relations. This then
leads to the second point: intellectual capital investment by activist international
lawyers can play a significant role in developing the approaches, procedures, and
instruments by which the international organizations can make themselves useful
in fulfilling that role.
The purpose of this tribute to Sir Joseph is not only to praise but also to build
on his advice. It is to reflect on the experience to date of international debt-crisis
management, with the successful improvisations and the unsolved problems, and
to draw the conclusion that order in international finance is not achievable
without the further development of international law. Finally, the substantive and
procedural scope for such legal development will be examined.
I. Reflections on the Legal Experience
of International Debt-Crisis Management
It is said that a success has many fathers but a failure has none. There are many
explanations as to why the debt crisis developed, and blame is apportioned by
observers and victims to various or all participants in it. Curiously enough,
little attention has been directed at the legal system that is at the core of
international lending and borrowing. There may be several reasons for this:
there are those, even among lawyers, who look at the issues as financial or
political rather than legal; others, whether creditors or debtors, favor legal
underdevelopment because they fear development, perceiving it as a threat to
their sovereignty or economic bargaining power; and some resign themselves to
"muddling through" in the face of an undoubtedly daunting problem. Yet, the
fact remains that the debt crisis can be seen in retrospect as a crisis, not only of
international finance but also of the international legal system, that was waiting
to occur.
The reasons for this are complex but nonetheless real. The successful creation
of a cooperative framework for multilateral payments among industrial countries
since the reestablishment of convertibility in the late 1950s and economic
prosperity with high savings in these countries went hand in hand with a
far-reaching liberalization of international financial and capital flows and
markets. The replacement of the par value system, on which these achievements
rested, with the existing freedom of exchange arrangements also replaced a legal
3. See Zamora, Recognition of Foreign Exchange Controls in International Creditors' Rights
Cases: The State of the Art, 21 INT'L LAW. 1055-82 (1987).
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system of "hard law" with one of "soft law,'' 4 giving scope and emphasizing
flexibility rather than discipline for economic management. This was followed
by a dramatic expansion of international lending by commercial banks under the
strong financial incentives of high liquidity and recycling of balance of payments
surpluses to deficit countries. The competition-driven internationalization and
deregulation of major financial markets that took advantage of these conditions
also involved the successful development of techniques for syndicated bank
lending by which the foreign exchange rate, interest rate, and liquidity risks of
funding loans were transformed into sovereign credit risk that the banking system
came to assume in unprecedented amounts.
This process was accompanied by what has turned out to be a very expensive
legal misunderstanding: the belief by commercial banks that in the absence of
international legal rules to deal with sovereign insolvency, sovereigns cannot
become insolvent. When these developments were followed by substantial
adjustments in international economic relations, the resulting severe structural
imbalances in the international economy led to instability in foreign exchange
rates, interest rates, and commodity prices. This instability in turn exposed a
high level of vulnerability in the system of international lending in the form of
excessive indebtedness by many developing countries. Since then, experience
has shown that even if sovereigns do not become insolvent in a legal sense, loans
to them can become very sour indeed in an economic sense. What is more, no
orderly way seems to exist by which either the sovereign can definitively
outgrow its excessive debt or the creditors can cut their losses.
These important changes in international finance were not matched by the
development of international rules that would have either limited the volatility of
foreign exchange and interest rates or limited and provided for the adjustment of
sovereign debt on the basis of an internationally agreed assessment of ability to
service it. Such relevant law as exists may be classified in three main categories:
(i) principles and rules based on contract, giving rise to most of the law of
international borrowing and lending, including negotiating techniques to
deal with the debtor's inability to pay;
(ii) national regulation of the country's international economic relations,
including foreign exchange controls and restrictions, banking regula-
tions, and the provision of economic assistance. These may be coordi-
nated at the international level, and produce new international norms for
the conduct of national behavior that may in turn lead to the adoption of,
or changes in, national regulation or other action (e.g., understandings
reached in the Paris Club official debt rescheduling Agreed Minutes5 or
4. See Gold, Strengthening the Soft International Law of Exchange Arrangements, in 2 LEGAL
AND INSTITUTIONAL ASPECTS OF THE INTERNATIONAL MONETARY SYSTEM: SELECTED ESSAYS 515-79 (IMF
1984).
5. See A. RIEFFEL, THE ROLE OF THE PARIS CLUB IN MANAGING DEBT PROBLEMS (Essays in
International Finance No. 161, Princeton University, 1985).
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the Basle (Cooke) Committee on Banking Regulations and Supervisory
Practices); 6 and
(iii) the rules of international economic organizations, under which they can
support the national economic and financial policies of the debtor
countries with their own resources and catalyze financial support from
others, as shown by the use of the IMF's stand-by arrangements and
structural adjustment loans, and by the World Bank's structural and
sectoral lending agreements. This category also includes the "soft law"
of IMF surveillance over all of its members' exchange rate policies,7 the
exercise of its regulatory jurisdiction over exchange restrictions and
similar practices, and the limited extraterritorial effect of that juris-
diction under article VIII, section 2(b) of the Fund's Articles of
Agreement. 8
Under this system, the elements of crisis prevention may exist under the
second category of law (national regulations, especially if internationally
coordinated), but have proven to be ineffective under financial pressure. It may
well be that improvements in the light of experience will take place, and there are
indications of this in the harmonization of risk-based bank regulatory standards
for capital adequacy on the basis of the framework developed by the Basle
Committee on Banking Regulations and Supervisory Practices. 9 As these
standards apply to banks, however, their crisis-preventing effects may turn out to
be rather limited in the age of securitization. Effective preventive techniques
have not yet developed, however, either in the law of international loan
agreements or in the law and practices of international organizations. 10
The elements of crisis management, as distinguished from prevention, exist in
all three categories, and it is the coordinated development and skillful use of
these elements, on the basis of the IMF's stand-by arrangement, that has
succeeded in keeping the debt crisis from becoming a generalized financial crisis.
6. See infra note 9.
7. See Gold, supra note 4.
8. See 3 J. GOLD, THE FUND AGREEMENT IN THE COURTS (IMF 1986).
9. BASLE COMM. ON BANKING REGs. & SUPERVISORY PRACTICES, INTERNATIONAL CONVERGENCE OF
CAPITAL MEASUREMENTS AND CAPITAL STANDARDS (July 1988).
10. Although the Fund's financial activities have been designed to support the prevention of
disequilibrium as well as the restoration of equilibrium in the balance of payments of members
requesting the use of the Fund's resources, a shortcoming of the Fund's system is that if a member
can obtain international financial resources outside the Fund without adopting the policies that would
qualify it for the use of the Fund's resources, the Fund's system becomes ineffective. In this
connection, see the U.S. International Lending Supervision Act of 1983, 12 U.S.C. § 3904 (Supp.
11 1984), under which "a failure by the foreign country to comply with any International Monetary
Fund or other suitable adjustment program" is a factor, among others, by which federal banking
regulators are to judge the need for a special reserve due to impairment of a banking institution's
assets "by a protracted inability of public or private borrowers in a foreign country to make payments
on their external indebtedness." Id. § 3904(a). Similar considerations apply to structural adjustment
loans and similar lending by the World Bank.
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The "Baker Plan," proposed and implemented since 1985, has been built on the
strategic concept of a continued central policy role for the IMF in conjunction with
structural adjustment lending by the multilateral development banks and increased
commercial bank lending in support of comprehensive adjustment programs by the
principal debtor countries. Crisis management, however, is a matter of improvisation.
It has not succeeded in solving the crisis, even though continuing improvisations,
including "the menu approach," may allow for its gradual diminution.
To sum up, the existing international legal system has not prevented the devel-
opment of the debt crisis and has been insufficient to date regarding its solution,
although it has been largely successful until now from the standpoint of the global
financial system in containing it. It may be that containment of the problem has
actually impeded a more systematic solution, leaving this for the future.
II. Can Order in International Finance Be
Achieved without International Law?
The question stated in this title may appear to be rhetorical, and it is. Order in
international finance is a condition based on the observance of international economic
law, 1" which includes legal principles to which international transactions are subject
in the same way that a domestic loan agreement is subject to domestic law.
A problem of disorder in international financial relations arises when a basic
principle of international law, that agreements should be observed, comes into
conflict with the sovereign debtor's inability to obtain the foreign exchange
resources needed to meet the external debt service obligations of the economy
subject to its control while simultaneously meeting its other governmental
responsibilities (hereafter referred to as sovereign insolvency).1 2 This is a legal
problem for several reasons. First, the sovereign itself is an entity defined by
international law as a subject of the international legal system, both bound by the
rules of the system and able by its actions to affect its evolution. State
responsibility for debt contracted by governments and the right of the state to
regulate the value of its money consistently with its international obligations,
including the imposition of exchange restrictions, are principles of international
law on which international loan transactions rest and by which they are affected.
Second, there are legal difficulties in enforcing international debt against
sovereign debtors. Military action for this purpose is not consistent with inter-
national law,' 3 and economic coercion as a remedy against insolvency is likely
11. "International law" is used in this article to include internationally agreed norms of national
behavior that result in national regulation or other official action.
12. It should be noted that the definition covers both service of the sovereign's own debt and the
foreign exchange policies that enable or prevent the sovereign's residents to meet their external debt
service obligations.
13. U.N. CHARTER art. 2(4) provides: "All Members shall refrain in their international relations
from the threat or use of force against the territorial integrity or political independence of any state,
or in any manner inconsistent with the Purposes of the United Nations."
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to be ineffective for creditors as a class. 14 The same is true for legal actions in
national courts to collect debt against insolvent sovereign debtors, which may be
regarded as a form of economic coercion. It is difficult indeed to have national
courts sit in judgment of foreign sovereigns, let alone enforce their judgments
against them. 15 There is no shortage of legal theory to argue this proposition, even
if the laws and judicial decisions in certain creditor countries would allow for some
exceptions to traditional principles of sovereign immunity from suit and execution of
judgment. 16 An aspect of this problem is the identity of debtors, because sovereign
insolvency involves both the sovereign's own debt, the service of which is interrupted,
and private sector debt of the sovereign's residents that the residents are not able to
service or are prevented from servicing, as a result of the sovereign's actions. 1
7
Third, there is an important legal asymmetry in the rules applicable to
international as distinguished from domestic lending. Legal protection of the
parties and the community as a whole from the consequences of the debtor's
inability to service its debt exist only in domestic legal systems in the form of
bankruptcy/insolvency rules and procedures. No comparable rules and proce-
dures exist in the international legal system with respect to private lending to
sovereigns, 18 with the consequence of a legal vacuum that national rules cannot
19
and international loan agreements do not fill.
20
14. For an interesting study of the experience of the 1930s, showing that eventually all debts are
settled by reduction of the debt servicing burden of debtors, although over a protracted period and at
a great cost, see M. SKILES, LATIN AMERICAN INTERNATIONAL LOAN DEFAULTS IN THE 1930's: LESSONS FOR
THE 1980's (Federal Reserve Bank of New York Research Paper No. 8812, 1988).
15. See Buchheit, Act of State and Comity: Recent Developments, in JUDICIAL ENFORCEMENT OF
INTERNATIONAL DEBT OBLIOAnONS 95-106 (D. Sassoon & D. Bradlow eds. 1987) [hereinafter JUDICIAL
ENFORCEMENT]. These difficulties are reflected in the general nonexercise of remedies for nonpayment under
loan agreements that are carefully drafted to provide creditors with the full range of protective clauses.
16. During the debt crisis of the 1930s there was little scope for litigation because the
courts in neither the United Kingdom nor the United States had any jurisdiction over
sovereigns. The position has changed in the 1970s in that respect, as both the U.K.
State Immunity Act of 1978 and the U.S. Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act of 1976
made a functional distinction between a State's economic activities and its other acts.
In practice, courts can be helpful only when attachable assets exist abroad and debtor
governments are free to repatriate those before proceedings are initiated.
F. PARKINSON, SOME LEGAL AND INSTITUTIONAL ASPECTS OF THE DEBT CRISIS IN INTERNATIONAL LAW AND
THE INTERNATIONAL SYSTEM 155-68 (1987); see also Delaume, Sovereign Immunity From Execution
and Transnational Loans, in Judicial Enforcement, supra note 15, at 73-93.
17. This distinction has led to the legal principle in the Fund that the Fund can approve exchange
restrictions imposed by the sovereign, but not the sovereign's failure to service its own debt. As a
result, the Fund's jurisdiction is limited in dealing with sovereign insolvency.
18. With respect to intersovereign lending some international norms have developed, and may
develop further in the Paris Club. See supra note 5.
19. See Walde, The Sanctity of Debt and Insolvent Countries: Defenses of Debtors in
International Loan Agreements, in JUDICIAL ENFORCEMENT, supra note 15, at 119-45.
20. Interestingly, while a state party to a treaty can invoke fundamental change of circumstances,
which is a principle of customary international law that was codified under article 62 of the Vienna
Convention on the Law of Treaties, as grounds for terminating or withdrawing from the treaty, or
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It follows from these considerations that disorder in international finance can
be avoided only as long as the sovereign borrower is willing and able both to
meet its international financial legal obligations based on contract and to enable
or permit its residents to do so with respect to their own debt obligations. 2' The
sovereign's ability to do so can be reinforced by financial resources obtained
under, and on the basis of, IMF stand-by arrangements and structural adjustment
loans and similar policy-based lending by the World Bank. Resources from these
institutions are not provided to support creditors as such, however, but to assist
the sovereign to acquire, maintain, or recover its access to external financing on
the basis of creditworthiness. These instruments have become part of the inter-
national legal system as useful adaptations through which these institutions of
intergovernmental cooperation can support order in international finance. The
instruments have been insufficient, however, to deal fully with a task for which
they were not designed.
Accordingly, while order in international finance is a condition based on and
supported by rules and instruments of international law, the existing rules and
instruments have been found inadequate in protecting the order. This leads to the
question of what legal development would be desirable to improve on this
situation. In exploring this topic, the author wishes to emphasize that he is doing
so in a personal capacity, without consideration of the matter by the management
of either the Bank or the Fund.
suspending the operation of the treaty, it has no comparable legal remedy under normal international
loan agreements that are not treaties. Article 62 of the Vienna Convention provides:
Fundamental Change of Circumstances
1. A fundamental change of circumstances which has occurred with regard to those
existing at the time of the conclusion of a treaty, and which was not foreseen by the
parties, may not be invoked as grounds for terminating or withdrawing from the
treaty unless:
(a) the existence of those circumstances constituted an essential basis of the consent
of the parties to be bound by the treaty; and
(b) the effect of the change is radically to transform the extent of obligations still to
be performed under the treaty.
2. A fundamental change of circumstances may not be invoked as a ground for
terminating or withdrawing from a treaty:
(a) if the treaty establishes a boundary; or
(b) if the fundamental change is the result of a breach by the party invoking it either
of an obligation under the treaty or of any other international obligation owed to any
other party to the treaty.
3. If, under the foregoing paragraphs, a party may invoke a fundamental change of
circumstances as a ground for terminating or withdrawing from a treaty it may also
invoke the change as a ground for suspending the operation of the treaty.
21. See F. PARKINSON, supra note 16, at 166, observing that notwithstanding the debt crisis,
basic principles have been preserved regarding the debtor's obligation to pay interest
promptly and the responsibilities of successor governments to service previously
contracted debts. On the other hand, the commercial banks have repeatedly acknowl-
edged the need to reschedule troubled debts, but never the borrower's right to
restructuring, much less to concessionary terms.
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III. Improved Order Through Legal
Development: Substantive Content
An improved international legal system should both prevent the recurrence of
a generalized debt problem and deal with particular cases of sovereign insolvency
in a clear and definitive way. The preventive and remedial aspects of the system
should be mutually reinforcing, in that the existence of remedy should in itself
help prevent excesses in international borrowing and lending, and the existence
of preventive measures should create confidence in the effectiveness of the
remedy. Thus, the system should be a stable one that would operate not only in
times of crisis but also on a continuing basis as part of an improved financial
system by which the financing process of economic development would be placed
on a sound footing. What features would such a legal system have?
A. CRISIS PREVENTION
As sound national economic and financial policies by all economically
important countries are the indisputable basis of any effective international
system, there is a clear need to strengthen the international monetary system with
symmetrical obligations for surplus and deficit countries and better policy
coordination among the major industrial countries. There is the further need to
develop and rely on a credible system for the policy-based international credit-
worthiness evaluation of borrowing countries that would become the basis for
access by these countries to international credit. Some efforts to achieve such a
result were made during the build-up phase of the present debt problem on the
basis of IMF article IV consultations, the collection of information on interna-
tional debt by the World Bank and the Bank for International Settlements, and
national banking supervision with international coordination on the basis of such
information. Whether the system of bank supervision that failed to avoid the debt
crisis was adequate but mismanaged, or was inadequate, is a matter for historical
argument. It is a fact, however, that a coherent and full-fledged international
creditworthiness evaluation system of borrowing countries does not exist now, as
it has been strongly resisted by both borrowers and lenders who have favored the
very processes that have led to excess. Yet, without appropriate lending super-
vision, whether at the national level in creditor countries or at the intergovern-
mental level, the boom/bust cycle of international finance is limited only by
circumstances and the length of memory.
Cooperative international approaches to risk evaluation may take various
forms. Should a system be established in a credible and useful way, Sir Joseph
Gold's advice regarding IMF stand-by arrangements as the basis for
international lending could well be applied to the international credit ratings, as
could IMF article IV consultations if further developed in this direction, with
supporting institutional and legal arrangements at both the national and the
international levels. This would have promotional effects for good credits and
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offer clear warning signals and disincentives for others. In this way, a
generalized debt crisis would be less likely to recur, because creditor banks,
their national authorities, shareholders, and depositors would be in a position to
see clearly whether bank managements have begun to respond to competitive
pressures by taking on excessive risks. Similar considerations would apply to
other lenders also.
For such a system to operate successfully, it would need a highly professional
and strong institutional stature. Inspiration may be sought by drawing on the
experience of the Bretton Woods institutions as the best that international
economic cooperation has as yet produced.22 Further, appropriate safeguards to
respect the interests of both the majorities in these institutions and the debtor
countries would need to be devised.
In order to assess the probability of loss for risky lending, the risk
assessments would need to take into account the way in which sovereign
insolvency would be handled in the improved international legal system. This
need is in itself an argument in favor of improvement of the legal system,
because the existing outcome of a sovereign's inability to service its debt is
uncertain. It can lead to a protracted process of negotiations that may cover both
the sovereign's own debt and the private sector debt of the sovereign's residents,
punctuated by "agreements" with the assembly of "financial packages." In many
cases, however, experience has shown that the "agreements" do not hold because
the "financial packages" are inadequate for anything but a limited period of time.
The effective outcome of what has become a process tends in these circumstances
to remain unclear. Full predictability probably cannot be achieved in this complex
area, but a clearer system would promote better analysis and perhaps over time
reasonable expectations within a range of probabilities based on experience.
B. REMEDY FOR INSOLVENCY: ADJUSTMENT OF SOVEREIGN DEBT
The closest and most modem national law analogy for dealing through a
judicial procedure with the sovereign's inability to service its external debt is
chapter 9 of the U.S. Bankruptcy Code, which provides for "adjustment of debts
of a municipality.' '23 Under this law, proceedings may be commenced only by
the municipality, and unless the municipality consents or the plan for adjustment
of its debts so provides, the court may not interfere with any of the political or
governmental powers of the debtor, any of the property or revenue of the debtor,
or the debtor's use or enjoyment of any income-producing property. 24 The
22. See Silard, International Economic Institutions-the Challenge of Co-ordination, in INTER-
NATIONAL ECONoMIC LAW AND DEVELOPING STATES: SOME ASPECTS 27-45 (1988), also reprinted in 4
AM. U.J. INT'L L. & POL'Y 67-89 (1989).
23. 11 U.S.C. § 901 (1982 & Supp. IV 1986).
24. Id. § 904.
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initiation of the proceedings automatically stays the enforcement of claims
against the municipality, which is responsible for filing a list of creditors and a
plan for adjustment of its debts. The plan is subject to confirmation by the court
in accordance with criteria specified in the law. These criteria normally, but not
invariably, include the acceptance by creditors holding two-thirds in amount and
more than one-half in number of the allowed claims, by class of substantially
similar claims as designated by the court, and the basic finding that the plan is
in the best interests of creditors and is feasible. The court may permit the
issuance of certificates of indebtedness by the municipality in order to provide it
with operating funds, and these certificates may be given security and priority
over other claims; and the plan may include the exchange of a new security under
the plan for a claim covered by the plan with retroactive effect. If the plan is
confirmed, its provisions bind both the municipality and any of its creditors,
whether or not the creditors had accepted the plan, and the debtor is discharged
from all debts as determined by the court.25 Important features of this procedure
are that the court may retain jurisdiction over the case for such period of time as
is necessary for the successful execution of the plan; 26 and may dismiss the case
for material default by the municipality with respect to a term of the plan. 27
Reflections on the usefulness of this U.S. national law analogy for dealing
with sovereign insolvency bring several points to mind. First, it is interesting to
note how rudimentary the international legal system is in this respect: insolvent
states have far less formal protection under international law than do municipal-
ities under U.S. law.28 Second, this imbalance should not be surprising, because
sovereign states do not enjoy the benefits or bear the burdens that participation
in the federal system involves for municipalities and their residents in the United
States. Third, any attempt to use the national law analogy as a basis for the
development of international law would probably have to involve a higher level
of effective international cooperation than has been achieved thus far. Never-
theless, the development of the law itself might be a means to that effect. The
principles derived from national law would need to be supplemented in order to
cover the inherently international aspects of the subject. The additional principles
would include: an impartial and professional international administration; the
promotion of sound balance of payments and economic development policies by
the debtor consistently with orderly relations of the economy, subject to the
sovereign's control, with creditors; adequate new financing in the economic
25. Id. § 944.
26. Id. § 945.
27. Id. § 927.
28. See M. NITSCH & A. MALAGARDIS, LIVING WITH SOVEREIGN DEBTORS: THE DEBT CRISIS OF
DEVELOPING COUNTRIES AND INTERNATIONAL INSOLVENCY RULES (1988). The lack of protection for
insolvent states may suggest either that it has not been considered necessary in view of the ability of
states to protect themselves by other means or that the true cost of the lack of protection for the
community has been underestimated.
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sense (rather than the recycling of debt service payments); privileged position for
both the new credits and the credits of the World Bank, the IMF, the BIS, and the
regional development institutions; 29 and broad international support and credible
assurances that the debtor will "get back on its feet" on the basis of the approved
financial plan. How could this be achieved?
IV. Options for Implementation
It seems useful to distinguish between the implementation of preventive and
remedial approaches, because the interests involved are different. Prevention of
a financial crisis is a stronger objective for the international community as a
whole and the major creditor countries, than for particular creditors and
sovereign debtors, whose interests in turn are stronger in dealing with the
resolution of a particular case of sovereign insolvency affecting them than with
its systemic implications. The interests of the international financial institutions
are overlapping: they have both systemic objectives and an immediate financial
interest in preventing and dealing with payments arrears to themselves.
A. CRISIS PREVENTION
A possible approach is through international credit rating upon the application
of the borrowing country wishing to assure lenders that it is a good credit risk.
The ratings would have to take into account the borrowing country's economic
policy performance and intentions, and in view of the nature of the pertinent
information and appraisal, the ratings would probably need to be official. There
would be no compulsion, but the lack of rating would carry a negative
implication, which lenders and their regulators could be expected to take into
account. This could involve the adaptation of risk-based capital adequacy
standards by bank regulators to reflect the risk ratings by reducing the capital
requirement for good ratings.
An alternative approach might be based on the registration of qualifying
debt,3° which could be given effect through nationally applied but internationally
monitored procedures, with appropriate technical assistance.
Another alternative approach might be through incentives by international
insurance or guarantees. Insurance ratings or guarantee policies would have to be
based on risk assessments relating to the international creditworthiness of the
29. The preferred creditor status of these institutions has been based on practice, although
payments arrears to some of these institutions have developed in fact. In an improved legal system
this practice would be expected to be codified in legal rules and dealing with payments arrears to the
institutions that may arise would be given priority.
30. For a discussion of how such an approach could be given effect by the creation of preferred
debt through registration under foreign exchange control rules, see Silard, Exchange Controls and
External Indebtedness: Are the Bretton Woods Concepts Still Workable?, 1984 HOUSToN J. INT'L L.
53, 81-83.
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borrower and the nature of lending. These principles in turn would tend to lead
to a systematic approach that bank supervisors and others could take into account
in their own standards of risk rating by giving preferential rating for insured or
guaranteed loans. Further development of the promising ideas in the Convention
Establishing the Multilateral Investment Guarantee Agency (MIGA) may well
point in this direction. 31 In this connection, it should be noted that both the
Fund32 and the Bank can undertake the performance of financial services, and
they can also do so jointly, including action as a credit-rating agency, even
though this has been vigorously objected to in the past.
B. ADJUSTMENT OF SOVEREIGN DEBT
If it is accepted that the lack of an adequate legal framework for the adjustment
of sovereign debt in cases of sovereign insolvency causes damage not only for
the particular creditors and debtors but for the international community as a
whole, including sovereigns of satisfactory creditworthiness, then it follows that
the ideal approach is to entrust the task to an official international authority with
adequate legal powers to represent the larger interests of the community while
guiding the negotiations among the interested parties. It is probable that solutions
based on incentives are the most likely to generate support for such an approach,
and this consideration suggests that financial leverage needs to be deployed in
favor of the legal powers in order to make the solutions workable.
The combination of what is needed would seem to be best achieved on the
basis of the Bretton Woods institutions, acting jointly or separately for this
purpose. Although they do have a financial stake in the outcome, the stake is held
for the community of their member states. As intergovernmental organizations
based on international law they can legitimately represent the community, can
provide substantial financial resources in favor of the solution, and can meet the
technical and professional requirements of the task.
The rules, procedures, and decisions for adjustment of sovereign debt should
be based also on international law if they are to be legitimate and hence
respected. There are various ways in which this could be done, including a new
treaty, amendment of the Articles of Agreement of the Bank and/or the Fund, or
the creation of new rules and regulations or decisions by these organizations
under their existing Articles of Agreement. An important consideration in
making the choice is how best the rules, procedures, and decisions on the
adjustment of sovereign debt could be given effect in national legal systems. It
is probable that a new treaty or amendment with national implementing
legislation would be the most productive. At the same time, the more flexible
31. See Multilateral Investment Guarantee Agency, Documents Submitted to the Board of
Governors of the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development at its 1985 Annual Meeting
(October 1985); 1. SHIHATA, MIGA AND FOREIGN INVESTMENT (1988).
32. See ARTICLES OF AGREEMENT OF THE INTERNATIONAL MONETARY FUND art. V, § 2(b).
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option of adopting the rules and regulations or decisions in existing international
organizations, on the basis of which national implementing legislation can be
adopted also, should not be ruled out because it may produce speedier results.
A further possibility would be the development of a new provision in
international loan agreements with sovereign borrowers that would provide for
the possibility of adjustment of loan terms under the agreement pursuant to an
agreed procedure in the event that the borrower becomes insolvent. The agreed
procedure could specify the ways in which the provision can be invoked, the
procedure to be followed, and the effects to be given to the results. It would be
possible, for example, to provide for payment of part of a country's external debt
in local currency, which could be used consistently with the debtor country's
monetary and fiscal policies that would meet specified criteria. Rules and
procedures based on contract may be expected to develop this way, with an
agreed central role for an international decision-making body whose determina-
tions the parties would agree in advance to accept, in ways similar to provisions
on arbitration.
Although this approach may appear more practical than the one based on the
creation of an official international authority with adequate legal powers, it has
inherent weaknesses. The weaknesses are that the provisions may not be
included in all borrowings by sovereigns, may not be uniform, may lead to
difficulties of implementation, and may not be a sufficient basis for new
financing in support of the borrower's economic stabilization and development
efforts with which the private creditors may be insufficiently concerned. Some of
these shortcomings may be counteracted, however, by including in the new
provision for the adjustment of loan terms a clause to give seniority in the
adjustment to claims under loan agreements that include the provision over other
claims (except for the claims of preferred creditors such as the Bank and the
Fund). National and international practices to give effect to the clause when
giving effect to the provision as a whole may be thus envisaged.
The best should not become the enemy of the good. It would also be possible
to work along these lines, perhaps on an interim basis, with efforts to develop
and refine such a technique based on the law of contract but supplemented by
procedures and decisions of international law, in a way similar to the use made
of IMF stand-by arrangements and enhanced surveillance that has developed as
a substitute for stand-by arrangements in cases in which Fund surveillance of a
member's economic policies and performance was requested without Fund
financing. It would also be possible to envisage a procedure based on enhanced
surveillance subject to the joint administration of the Fund and the Bank.
V. Concluding Observations
The international financial system needs repair. Who will repair it, and how,
are the questions. Cooperative solutions based on the rule of law should be
WINTER 1989
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preferred over the perpetuation of inherent instability that comes from the
inadequacy of international legal rules to deal with sovereign insolvency. The
absence of workable international legal procedures to protect creditors, debtors,
and the community adds an element of risk to international lending to developing
countries that is not present in domestic lending, where such protective legal
procedures exist. To make international lending and borrowing more secure
legally is not easy. The issues raised by the debt crisis are complex and the stakes
are high. A further advance in international law to prevent such crises in the
future and to help resolve particular cases of sovereign insolvency would put the
lessons of experience from the debt crisis to good use. The role of the
international lawyer is crucial in this effort. His role goes beyond the finding of
creative solutions to the clash of interests by improvisation and hence the
development of practices on a case-by-case basis. It is also his role to identify the
need for improvement in the international legal system, to propose solutions, to
argue for their adoption, and once adopted, to devise workable rules for
implementing them.
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